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means of deciding whether a card count or an election will be
used to reveal the employees' choice. This would also bring into
clearer focus the meaning of the refusal to bargain charge itself
in this area as the employer, after commencing collective bar-
gaining, has literally refused to continue. This policy would
protect the union's desire for stability when it is most essential-
during the actual bargaining process-and give greater weight
to the desirability of an accurate determination of employee
choice before this time. The union still has the right to file for
an NLRB election to counteract any delay in bargaining by the
employer.7 5 Under present procedure a union is able to secure
a certification election within ten to seventy days after filing
a petition,7 causing a minimum of delay. The proposed policy
looks to determining employee choice in the most effective man-
ner, placing priority on section 9(c) elections with section
8(a) (5) bargaining orders operative in the exceptional cases
where the employer has destroyed the possibility of a fair elec-
tion or has accepted the union and begun to bargain before
asserting a doubt of its majority.
L. Edwin Greer
THE AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE DOCTRINE IN
LOUISIANA MINERAL LAW
If A acquires ownership of property he previously sold while
not the owner to B, his after-acquired title inures to B. This
Comment explores the operation of this after-acquired title doc-
trine generally and, in Louisiana mineral rights.
PART I. FOUNDATION AND GENERAL APPLICATION
A. Foundation
Without express code authority, Louisiana courts have re-
peatedly asserted that the after-acquired title doctrine is a means
75. The union could file at the time of card presentation. Then if the employer
commits unfair labor practices, destroying 'a free election, refusal to bargain
chargds could be filed. Under Bernel Foam, 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964), the union
could utilize both methods.
76. Local Regional Directors are now permitted to decide representation ques-
tions and to direct elections, thus allowing speedy determination of questions
which formerly had to be channeled to Washington. Shuman, Requiring a Union
To Demonstrate its Majority Status by Means of an Election Becomes Riskier,
16 LAD. L.J. 426, 428 (1965).
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of enforcing the vendor's obligation of warranty.' Civil Code
article 25012 provides that even when no stipulations have been
made respecting warranty, the vendor must warrant the buyer
against eviction. Actual physical eviction not being necessary,
the mere threat of such eviction resulting from claims of third
persons or title outstanding in a third person is sufficient basis
for a call in warranty by the vendee.3 The warranty applies only
if the right of the person evicting existed before the sale.4 The
jurisprudence has ruled that this warranty is, in effect, a war-
ranty of title.- From these principles results the rule that if a
person sells property which he does not own and subsequently
acquires the ownership, his obligation of warranty causes the
property to inure to the vendee.
However, it is submitted that the doctrine also has a more
fundamental foundation. Planiol, asserting that it is based on
something deeper than mere warranty, mentions that a vendor
agreeing to procure the enjoyment of property for his vendee
1. Louisiana Canal Co. v. Leger, 237 La. 936, 112 So. 2d 667 (1959); Lun
Chow v. Board of Comm'rs, 203 La. 268, 13 So. 2d 857 (1943) ; Griffith's Estate
v. Glaze's Heirs, 199 La. 800, 7 So. 2d 62 (1942) ; Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana
v. Allison, 196 La. 838, 200 So. 273 (1941) ; Jackson v. United States Gas Pub.
Serv. Co., 196 La. 1, 198 So. 633 (1940); Cherami v. Cantrelle, 174 La. 995,
142 So. 150 (1932) ; Bickham v. Kelley, 162 La. 421, 110 So. 637 (1926) ; Guice
v. Mason, 156 La. 201, 100 So. 397 (1924) Bre wer v. New Orleans Land Co.,
154 La. 446, 97 So. 605 (1923) ; Wolf v. Carter, 131 La. 667, 60 So. 52 (1912) ;
Wells v. Blackman, 121 La. 394, 46 So. 437 (1908) ; Hayward v. Campbell, 119
La. 56, 43 So. 910 (1907) ; Barkley v. Succession of Steers, 47 La. Ann. 951, 17
So. 438 (1895) ; Succession of Dupuy, 33 La. Ann. 277 (1881) ; Rapp v. Lowry,
30 La. Ann. 1272 (1878) ; Crocker v. Hoag, 25 La. Ann. 159 (1873) ; Hale v.
City of New Orleans, 18 La. Ann. 321 (1866) Lee v. Ferguson, 5 La. Ann. 532
(1850) ; Noulen v. Perkins, 3 Rob. 233 (La. 1842) ; Stokes v. Shackleford, 12
La. 170 (1838) Fenn v. Rils. 9 La. 95 (1836) Woods v. Kimbal, 5 Mart. (N.S.)
246 (La. 1826) McGuire v. Amelung, 12 Mart. (O.S.) 649 (La. 1823) ; Bonin
v. Eyssaline, 12 Mart. (O.S.) 185 (La. 1822).
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2475 (1870) : "The seller is bound to two principal
obligations, that of delivering and that of warranting the thing which he sells."
Id. art. 2476: "The warranty respecting the seller has two objects; the first
is the buyer's peaceable possession of the thing sold, and the second is the hidden
defects of the thing sold or its redhibitory vices."
Id. art. 2501: "Although at the time of the sale no stipulations have been
made respecting the warranty, the seller is obliged, of course, to warrant the
buyer against the eviction suffered by him from the totality or part of the thing
sold, and against the charges claimed on such thing, which were not declared at
the time of the sale."
Id. art. 2500: "Eviction is the loss suffered by the buyer of the totality of
the thing sold, or of a part thereof, occasioned by the right or claims of a third
person."
3. Hausler v. Nuccio, 214 La. 1069, 39 So. 2d 734 (1949) ; Greer v. Sumney,
41 So. 2d 526 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949).
4. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2502 (1870) : "That the warranty should have exist-
ence, it is necessary that the right of the person evicting shall have existed before
the sale. If, therefore, this right before the sale was only imperfect, and is after-
wards perfected by the negligence of the buyer, he has no claim for warranty."
5. O'Reilly v. Poch6, 162 So. 2d 787 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
cannot contravene this obligation either by disturbing his pos-
session or by trying to take the property away. 6 Perhaps this is
what the Louisiana court in Rapp v. Lowry7 had in mind when
it applied the doctrine to a sale without warranty:
"It is shocking to morals, and to common honesty and
decency, it can not be tolerated in law, that a vendor, even
without warranty, should subsequently acquire a title su-
perior to that which he conveyed to his vendee, and attempt
to.oust his vendee under that title." (Emphasis added.) 8
At common law, even though there is no implied warranty as
in Louisiana, the after-acquired title doctrine is used.9 There, it
is based upon "estoppel by deed,"' 0 which seems to imply the
same moral imperative as Rapp v. Lowry. Thus, the doctrine
is not only based on enforcing the warranty against eviction but
also upon the principle that, assuming necessary formalities, a
person should keep his promises. Whenever a person purports
to convey property, the after-acquired title doctrine should apply.
Only when the vendor is simply releasing or "quit-claiming" his
present interest in property should it not apply.""
B. General Application
Although the subsequent acquisition by a vendor of property
sold before he was the owner inures to his vendee, the latter
has no greater rights in the property than had his vendor upon
the subsequent acquisition. In Barkley v. Succession of Steers12
the after-acquiring vendee's rights were subordinated to a spe-
cial mortgage with which the property passed encumbered into
the ownership of his vendor. For the after-acquired title doc-
trine to operate the vendor must subsequently acquire the prop-
erty in the same capacity in which he acted to sell it to the ven-
dee. For example, the court in Lauve v. Wilson 8 refused to
apply the doctrine when it found that the State of Louisiana
had sold property in the capacity of trustee for the schools and
subsequently acquired the same property as trustee for the
public:
9. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1471 (1959).
7. 30 La. Ann. 1272 (1878).
8. Id. at 1275, 1276.
9. 31 C.J.S. Eatoppel § 21.
10. Ibid.
11. See text accompanying notes 21 through 24 infra.
12. 47 La. Ann. 951, 17 So. 438 (1895).
13. 114 La. 699, 38 So. 522 (1905).
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"The title conveyed to plaintiff's author was a title held
in trust for A, and the title subsequently acquired and con-
veyed to defendant's author was acquired in trust for B.
The doctrine invoked cannot, therefore be applied.' 1 4
If the doctrine applies, no further action is required by either
of the parties. The subsequently-acquired title inures to the
vendee by the operation of law.15 The vendee need not call the
vendor in warranty and the vendor need not actually deliver a
new title document to the vendee. The vendee need not even be
aware of the defect in his title nor of the subsequent acquisition
by his vendor. The seller's new title vests immediately in the
buyer.
Since the vendor's after-acquired title vests immediately in
the vendee by operation of law, whether the vendee must accept
this new title depends upon when and how the vendee manifests
his intention not to accept the new title. Clearly, if the vendee
sues for rescission of the sale after the vendor has acquired the
new title, his suit is to no avail because the vendor's new title
vested in him immediately upon acquisition.' However, if the
vendee actually commences a suit for rescission before the vendor
acquires the new title, his suit cannot be defeated by the subse-
quent acquisition, and he is no longer required to take title. 17
As the court pointed out in Hale v. City of New Orleans,8 the
contract of sale is bilateral, requiring the consent of both par-
ties. The consent of the vendee is presumed if he remains in
possession of the property "without complaining" until the ven-
dor acquires title to it. "But it is impossible to presume such a
consent in the face of the action of nullity instituted by him
against the [vendor]. It was out of the power of the [vendor]
... to make a contract for the plaintiff against his will. . .."19
Bonin v. Eyssaline20 held that the vendee must actually sue for
rescission of the sale to show that he no longer consents to the
contract; public notice of intention to procure a rescission was
14. Id. at 703, 38 So. at 523.
15. Wells v. Blackman, 121 La. 394, 46 So. 437 (1908); Benton v. Sentell,
50 La. Ann. 809, 24 So. 297 (1898) ; Barkley v. Succession of Steers, 47 La. Ann.
951, 17 So. 438 (1895) ; Crocker v. Hoag, 25 La. Ann. 159 (1873) ; Hale v. City
of New Orleans, 18 La. Ann. 321 (1866).
16. Brady v. Falgout, 42 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. La. 1941) ; Bonin v. Eyssaline,
12 Mart. (O.S.) 185 (La. 1822).
17. Brewer v. New Orleans Land Co., 154 La. 446, 97 So. 605 (1923) ; Hale
v. City of New Orleans, 18 La. Ann. 321 (1866).
18. 18 La. Ann. 321 (1866).
19. Id. at 326.
20. 12 Mart. (O.S.) 185 (La. 1822).
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ineffective. Bringing of suit should not be required, however.
Following Hale, consent to the contract could not be presumed
in the face of the vendee's public notice of his intention to have
the sale rescinded.
The so-called quitclaim deeds, although not provided for in
the Code, have been fully recognized by the jurisprudence. 21
They seem to be permitted as a matter of freedom of contract.
The quitclaim differs from a sale without warranty in that it
does not purport to convey the property. A quitclaim simply
conveys or relinquishes in favor of another the present interest
of the grantor. If the grantor actually owns the land, the grantee
acquires it; but if he had no present interest in the. land, the
grantee acquires nothing. Although the question had been pre-
viously answered, 22 the court in Waterman v. Tidewater Asso-
ciated Oil Co. 23 fully discussed the problem of whether the doc-
trine of after-acquired title applies to such deeds. There, the
deed stated that the vendor had "remised, released, sold, con-
veyed, and quitclaimed ... all the right, title, interest, claim and
demand in the following described piece of land."
The court held:
"[I] t is quite manifest that the doctrine of after-acquired
title should not be expanded to include a quitclaim deed, pri-
marily for the reason that a conveyance of that character
transfers only the present interest of the vendor in the land
and does not convey the property."24
This decision is correct, for the vendor, by simply releasing any
interest he may have in the property at the time, does not neces-
sarily claim to have a present interest. The vendee knows what
he is purchasing and should not be able to claim more if the
vendor subsequently acquires an interest in the property.
Since the doctrine does not apply to a quitclaim deed, it is
important to determine whether the deed is actually a quitclaim.
Although the document in Rycade Oil Corp. v. Board of Commis-
sioners2 5 claimed to be a "quitclaim deed without recourse" and
21. Brazemore v. Whittington, 245 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1957); Waterman v.
Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 213 La. 588, 35 So. 2d 255 (1947); Benton v.
Sentell, 50 La. Ann. 869, 24 So. 297 (1898) ; Ryeade Oil Corp. v. Board of
Comm'rs, 129 So. 2d 302 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
22. Benton v. Sentell, 50 La. Ann. 869, 24 So. 297 (1898).
23. 213 La. 588, 35 So, 2d 255 (1947).
24. Id. at 611, 35 So. 2d 233.
25. 129 So.-2d-'302 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
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"without warranty," the doctrine of after-acquired title still
applied. The court looked beyond the label of the deed and saw
that the vendor actually contracted to transfer the land and not
merely the vendor's present interest. The court stated:
"[I] n view of these obligations we do not find the tech-
nical labeling of these transactions as quitclaim or non-war-
ranty deeds to be a valid basis for not applying the [after-
acquired title] doctrine to the present facts.126
If either the vendor or vendee dies, the courts have con-
sistently held that the heirs of the vendee may claitn the benefit
of the vendor's warranty and thus receive the after-acquired
title,27 and that an heir who unconditionally accepts the succes-
sion of a vendor is likewise bound to fulfill the obligation of
warranty. 28 For example, the doctrine would apply in the fol-
lowing situation: A widow sells property of her husband's suc-
cession when in fact part of the title to the property belongs to
her children. She dies and the children unconditionally accept
her succession. The children would be bound by their "after-
acquired obligation" and their title would vest in the mother's
vendee.
PART II. MINERAL RIGHTS
A. Servitude Application
Due to the prohibition against establishing mineral estates
apart from the land 29 and the courts' careful protection of "pub-
lic policy,"30 application of the after-acquired title doctrine to
Louisiana mineral law must be approached with caution. A land-
owner attempting to sell mineral rights which he does not own
creates problems requiring careful distinction between situations
calling for application of the after-acquired title doctrine31 and
those involving the prohibited sale of reversionary rights.32 Al-
26. Id. at 305.
27. Guice v. Mason, 156 La. 201, 100 So. 397 (1924); Wells v. Blackman,
121 La. 394, 46 So. 437 (1908).
28. Louisiana Canal Co. v. Leger, 237 La. 936, 112 So. 2d 667 (1959) ; Cherami
v. Cantrelle, 174 La. 995, 142 So. 150 (1932) ; Stokes v. Shackleford. 12 La. 170(1838) ; Guselich v. Hingle, 1 Pit. 208 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1918).
29. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs. 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922).
30. See Hardy, Public Policy and Terminability of Mineral Rights in Louisi-
ana, 26 LA. L. REV. 731 (1966).
31. White v. Hodges, 201 La. 1, 9 So. 2d 433 (1942).
32. Hicks v. Clark, 225 La. 133, 72 So. 2d 322 (1954).
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though non-landowners dealing with mineral interests can create
situations involving the after-acquired title doctrine, this discus-
sion is limited to transactions involving landowners. The basic
problem faced by the jurisprudence in this area is whether the
doctrine in particular applications transgresses the prohibitions
against dealing in reversionary interest.
However, the after-acquired title doctrine is consistent with
other mineral rights policies. It is consistent with retention of
control of interest in land in the hands of the surface owner 3
because the doctrine will not apply unless the vendor owns the
land subject to the mineral sale at the time of reversion. Like-
wise, the doctrine is not inconsistent with the policy of sim-
plicity34 of titles since it does not bind future owners of the land.
White v. Hodges,35 the first mineral rights case of particular
interest dealing with the after-acquired title doctrine, involved
an unintentional oversale of minerals to an innocent purchaser.
When the outstanding servitude terminated, the minerals re-
turned to the land and the after-acquired title doctrine applied,
establishing the vendee's servitude. The court in emphasizing
the innocent nature of the transaction stated:
"It also appears that the defendant did not purchase with
knowledge of the obstacle nor consent to it. There is nothing
in the record which would suggest in the slightest that .. .
the vendor and . . the vendee were attempting - by a sub-
terfuge contrary to public policy - in entering into this sale
of mineral rights, to create a servitude in order to avoid the
ten year prescriptive period for non-use, and to give the
servitude legal existence beyond that period of time. ' 86
The question of when prescription began to run against the over-
sold portion was answered by the obstacle theory of article 792.31
The court reasoned that the outstanding servitude was an ob-
stacle to the exercise of the servitude on the oversold portion;
thus, prescription did not begin to run until the obstacle had
33. See Hardy, Public Policy and Terminability of Mineral Rights in Louisi-
ana, 26 LA. L. REv. 731, 739 (1966).
34. Id. at 743.
35. 201 La. 1, 9 So. 2d 433 (1942).
36. Id. at 32, 9 So. 2d at 443.
37. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 792 (1870) : "If the owner of the estate to whom the
servitude is due, is prevented from using it by any obstacle which he can neither
prevent nor remove, the prescription of non-usage does not run against him as
long as this obstacle remains."
[Vol. XXVII
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been removed by termination of the outstanding servitude. The
same result could have been reached by a pure application of
the after-acquired title doctrine, without the use of the obstacle
theory. Since the vendor did not own the minerals at the time
of sale, the vendee acquired none, and the vendee's servitude did
not come into existence until the vendor subsequently acquired
the minerals by termination of the outstanding servitude. Cer-
tainly, prescription could not begin to run against the servitude
until it came into existence.
The next case to deal with the problem, McDonald v. Rich-
ard, 3 differs from White v. Hodges in two significant respects:
(1) the purchaser had knowledge of the previous sale,39 and
(2) the vendor no longer owned the land at the termination of
the outstanding servitude. The question facing the court was
whether the minerals inured to the owner of the land at the
termination of the outstanding servitude or to the vendee of a
previous owner of the land who did not own the minerals at
the time of the sale. The court answered the question by apply-
ing the after-acquired title doctrine. Dr. Richard did not own
the mineral interests he sold Laux and Schuh. It was a sale of
property belonging to another, and, thus, null. 40 The only way
for Laux and Schuh to acquire the mineral rights through Dr.
Richard was for him subsequently to acquire them - which he
never did because he sold the land prior to the termination of
the outstanding servitude. The court stated:
"If, in this instance, Dr. Richard had not disposed of the
land, after he sold the mineral rights to Laux and Schuh, but
had remained the owner of the land until the time when the
mineral rights which had been retained by the Morley Cypress
Company lapsed by effect of the liberative prescription of
10 years, Laux and Schuh and their transferees would have
acquired thereby the mineral rights which the Morley Cypress
Company lost by prescription. But there is no theory on
which Laux and Schuh or their transferees . . . can claim
successfully that they acquired from Dr. Richard mineral
rights which he never owned- either at the time when or
38. 203 La. 155, 13 So. 2d 712 (1943).
39. Id. at 165, 13 So. 2d at 715.
40. LA. CIVIL CoIE art. 2452 (1870) : "The sale of a thing belonging to an-
other person is null; it may give rise to damages, when the buyer knew not that
the thing belonged to another person."
1967)
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after he made what purported to be sales of mineral rights
to Laux and Schuh.' '41
In explaining why the obstacle theory of White v. Hodges
should not be applied to the case, the court said that the theory
only applied to obstacles to which the owner of the servitude has
not consented.4 2 The court concluded that the theory did not
permit a landowner to suspend or extend the period of prescrip-
tion of ten years by which servitudes are extinguished for non-
user, by selling his so-called "reversionary interest" in a mineral
servitude:
"Even though a sale by a landowner of his so-called
reversionary interest in mineral rights which he previously
has sold to someone else cannot have effect until and unless
the mineral rights previously sold become extinguished by
the prescription of 10 years for nonuser, nevertheless the
sale of the so-called reversionary interest itself is subject to
the liberative prescription of 10 years from the moment of
the sale of the so-called reversionary interest." (Emphasis
added.)43
Again the same result could have been reached by a pure
application of the after-acquired title doctrine without resort to
the obstacle theory. Under the doctrine there is no question of
when prescription began to run against the oversold mineral
servitude for it never became effective. Dr. Richard did not
own the minerals; he could not sell what he did not own; he
never acquired them; thus, his vendee never acquired a servitude
on the land because the after-acquired title doctrine did not
operate. Since they never had a servitude, there is no question
of when it began to prescribe.
The final case of the series, Bates v. Monzingo,44 adds little
to the area, for it merely cites both White v. Hodges and Mc-
Donald v. Richard as authority and gives no theoretical reason
for its decision. The crucial fact of the case is that the vendor
of the oversold minerals still owned the land at the termination
of the outstanding servitude, making application of the after-
adquired title doctrine possible. Here, the court did not consider
the intention of the parties, nor did it look to see if the pur-
41. McDonald v. Richard, 203 La. 155, 162-63, 13 So. 2d 712, 715 (1943).
42. Id. at 165, 13 So. 2d at 715.
43. Id. at 165, 13 So. 2d at 715-16.
44. 221 La. 479, 59 So. 2d 693 (1952).
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chaser of the oversold minerals had knowledge of the previous
sale as was done in both White v. Hodges and McDonald v.
Richard.
To be considered with these cases involving application of
the after-acquired title doctrine is Hicks v. Clark,4 5 in which a
landowner, after selling the minerals to one person, sold the land
to another and reserved the reversionary right in the the min-
erals to himself. Thus, he was attempting to reserve the rever-
sionary right and have the minerals revert to him individually
at the termination of the outstanding servitude instead of re-
verting to the land. Because such a transaction, if given effect,
would burden the land without user for more than ten years,
the court considered "the reservation of the reversionary inter-
est . . . as an effort to circumvent the public policy of this
state."
46
From the above, the present state of the law seems to be as
follows: White v. Hodges may still be valid if limited to its facts,
i.e., an innocent oversale of minerals with the vendor remaining
in possession of the land at the termination of the outstanding
servitude. Under McDonald v. Richard it is not possible for an
intentional over-purchaser to acquire the minerals upon termina-
tion of the outstanding servitude. It may also be that McDonald
v. Richard has imposed further limitation on White v. Hodges
by requiring prescription to begin to run on the innocent trans-
action from the purported sale. However, this result is question-
able. The intentional dealing with the reversionary rights as
such is clearly prohibited if Hicks v. Clark is considered as
limiting McDonald v. Richard. Thus, the question of McDonald
v. Richard is whether one may disguise intentional dealing with
reversionary rights by expressing the transaction in the form of
a present sale and applying the after-acquired title doctrine. The
policy base of Hicks suggests that this may not be possible.
Certainly, if such a transaction is possible, prescription would
begin to run from the purported sale.47 In all circumstances,
whether the purchaser has knowledge of the oversale or not,
the vendor must remain owner of the land until termination of
the outstanding servitude in order for the after-acquired title
doctrine to apply.
45. 225 La. 133, 72 So. 2d 322 (1954).
46. Id. at 141, 72 So. 2d At 325.
47. McDonald v. Richard, 203 La. 155, 13 So. 2d 712 (1943).
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The problem in this area of law is apparently caused by a
judicial feeling that there is a conflict between two basic public
policies. The courts want to enforce the moral imperative48
underlying the after-acquired title doctrine and require a vendor
to deliver the property he purported to sell. On the other hand,
there is a decided public policy against dealing in the rever-
sionary rights to mineral interests.49 Under the circumstances
discussed above, the courts appear to feel that the two policy
elements are in conflict, that one cannot be applied to its fullest
extent without impinging on the other. It seems that the juris-
prudence reflects a conviction that permitting unrestricted ap-
plication of the after-acquired title doctrine would permit par-
ties to enter into transactions which can not be executed directly,
i.e., deal with reversionary interests.
The following alternatives are open to the court: (1) refuse
to apply the after-acquired title doctrine entirely; (2) apply the
doctrine fully regardless of the knowledge or intention of the
parties with the result that prescription would run from the
after-acquired title date; (3) apply the doctrine only in the case
of innocent oversales; (4) apply the doctrine in both situations,
but have prescription run from the purported sale in the inten-
tional situation and from the reversion in the innocent situation;
and (5) apply the doctrine in both situations but have prescrip-
tion begin to run from the purported sale.
The policy questions behind the first alternative of refusing
to apply the after-acquired title doctrine entirely would rule
against the idea. As previously shown there are moral bases be-
hind the doctrine which force a vendor to fulfill his promises.
Refusing to apply the doctrine not only aids the bad faith ven-
dors, but injures the innocent good-faith purchaser who other-
wise would acquire the minerals when the outstanding servitude
terminated.
There is a great deal to be said in favor of applying the
doctrine regardless of the knowledge or intention of the par-
ties.50 Administratively, the rule would be easy to apply. How-
ever, it would sharply conflict with both McDonald v. Richard51
48. See text accompanying note 7 8upra.
49. Hicks v. Clark, 225 La. 133, 72 So. 2d 322 (1954).
50. See text at notes 54 and 55 infra.
51. 203 La. 155, 13 So. 2d 712 (1948).
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and Hicks v. Clark.5 2 Thus, this alternative would be so dis-
ruptive of the current law that its application is inadvisable.
The third and fourth alternatives are likewise inadvisable,
but for administrative reasons. Distinguishing between innocent
and intentional oversales requires judicial determination of the
purchaser's subjective intention or knowledge of previous over-
sales. The burden of proof problem alone makes such a determi-
nation impractical.
Applying the doctrine in both situations but having prescrip-
tion beginning to run from the purported sale- the fifth al-
ternative - may be the best and is the current law. 53 There
would be no problem of dealing with the subjective; the innocent
purchaser would be moderately protected; and intentional over-
sales would be made less attractive. However, it should be noted
that permitting prescription to run from the purported sale is
not consistent with the after-acquired title doctrine. Under that
doctrine, prescription could not begin to run until the oversold
servitude became vested by the termination of the outstanding
servitude. As previously stated, the obstacle theory is based on
creation of a present interest by the sale. It is submitted that
this theory is inconsistent with the after-acquired title doctrine,
which does not create a present interest, and should be rejected
in favor of a strict policy determination.
However, the second alternative of permitting prescription to
run from the vesting of the servitude on the oversold minerals
by operation of the after-acquired title doctrine is not contrary
to established public policy. The public policy is against burden-
ing the land54 with a mineral servitude for a longer period then
ten years without user. Where the after-acquired title doctrine
applies, the land is not burdened at all. That doctrine is based on
the personal obligation of warranty imposed on the vendor.
55
If he does not own the land when the outstanding servitude
terminates, the servitude on the oversold minerals never becomes
effective. Thus, there is no burden on the land, and it should not
be against public policy.
Long-Bell Lumber Co. v. Granger56 is the only other mineral
servitude case dealing with the after-acquired title doctrine
52. 225 La. 133, 72 So. 2d 322 (1954).
53. McDonald v. Richard, 203 La. 155, 13 So. 2d 712 (1943).
54. Hicks v. Clark, 225 La. 133, 72 So. 2d 322 (1954).
55. See text accompanying note 1 8upra.
56. 222 La. 670, 63 So. 2d 420 (1952).
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worthy of discussion. In that case Long-Bell Petroleum Com-
pany, although already owning the minerals in a tract of land,
re-acquired the same interest through another transaction with
the same vendor. It argued that the transaction constituted an
"oversale of the minerals" which resulted, under the after-
acquired title doctrine, in establishing a new servitude when
the old one terminated. The court, following article 2443, 57
decided that since Long-Bell Petroleum Company already owned
the minerals it was impossible for it to purchase them again.
Therefore, the after-acquired title doctrine was not applied. The
court in distinguishing White v. Hodges, McDonald v. Richard,
and Bates v. Monzingo stated:
"In none did the same party, as here, purchase identical
minerals; in each the purchase was by a third party."58
Thus, Long-Bell Lumber Co. v. Granger stands for the proposi-
tion that a landowner can not create a succession of servitudes
in the same party. This certainly means that deliberate over-
sales would have little market value as a general proposition.
Therefore, as the after-acquired title doctrine involves the per-
sonal obligation of the vendor who must remain in possession
of the land at the reversion, there seems to be little danger of
damaging the public policy if the after-acquired title doctrine
were applied to its fullest extent.
B. Lease Application
Whether the warranty of a mineral lessor is the same as that
of an ordinary vendor is not completely clear. Substantial juris-
prudence"0 prior to Gulf Refining Co. v. GlassellO held that the
mineral lessor is in the same position as a vendor under article
2501.61 However, the Glassell decision's holding that a mineral
57. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2443 (1870): "He who is already the owner of a
thing, can not validly purchase it. If he buys it through error, thinking it the
property of another, the act is null, and the price must be restored to him."
58. Long-Bell Lumber Co. v. Granger, 222 La. 670, 677, 63 So. 2d 420, 422
(1952).
59. Lockwood Oil Co. v. Atkins, 158 La. 610, 104 So. 386 (1925) ; Cooke v.
Gulf Refining Co., 135 La. 609, 65 So. 758 (1914) ; Rives v. Gulf Refining Co.,
133 La. 178, 62 So. 623 (1913).
60. 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936).
61. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2501 (1870): "Although at the time of the sale no
stipulations have been made respecting the warranty, the seller is obliged, of
course, to warrant the buyer against the eviction suffered by him from the
totality or part of the thing sold, and against the charges claimed on such things,
which were not declared at the time of the sale."
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lessee was no more than an ordinary predial lessee and was not
the owner of a real right entitled to assert the real actions
together with the subsequent statutory enactments02 and judicial
decisions 3 detailing the running battle over the nature of the
mineral lease at least raise some question as to the standing of
the mineral lessee insofar as the matter of warranty is con-
cerned. If the mineral lessee is in no better position than ordi-
nary predial lessee, the fundamental obligation of the lessor is
to assure the lessee of peaceable possession, though the lessor
may be liable in damages if there is an actual eviction. However,
the predial lessee may not attack his lessor's title and may not
take a lease from another party claiming the same property. If,
on the other hand, the mineral lessor is in the same position as
a vendor of land or real rights therein, the obligation in war-
ranty is considerably greater, as outlined in the prior discus-
sion. 4 One Supreme Court decision 5 since Glassell has held
that the assignor of a working interest is in the same position
as an ordinary vendor. A subsequent court of appeal decision 0
has applied that decision to a mineral lessor. Thus, the question
cannot be said to be free of confusion. Certainly, viewing the
fact that the mineral lease functions as a real right and that in
reality the lessee acquires a right of exploration and an interest
in production basically similar to the owner of a mineral servi-
tude, distinguishable principally by the mutual expectation of
development and the intricate set of contractual relationships
concerning development, it seems that the better view would be
that the lessor is bound in warranty in the same manner as an
ordinary vendor. As a practical matter, however, the confusion
of the jurisprudence is avoided in the standard lease by express
warranty clauses. 67
62. See note 63 inIra.
63. For a discussion of this battle see the following cases: Reagan v. Murphy,
235 La. 529, 105 So. 2d 210 (1958) ; Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Reese, 195 La.
359, 196 So. 558 (1940) ; Allison v. Maroun, 193 La. 286, 190 So. 408 (1939)
Payne v.Walmsley, 185 So. 88 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
64. See text accompanying notes 1 through 5 supra.
65. Tomlinson v. Thurmon. 189 La. 959, 181 So. 458 (1938).
66. Carter Oil Co. v. King, 134 So. 2d 89 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961). It should
be noted that this court relied on Tomlinson v. Thurmon, 189 La. 959, 181 So. 458
(1938).
67. For example, Bath's Form Louisiana Spec. 14BRI-2A contains the follow-
ing warranty: "Lessor hereby warrants and agrees to defend the title to said land
and agrees that lessee at its option may discharge any tax, mortgage or other lien
upon said land and in event lessee does so, it shall be subrogated to such lien
with the right to enforce same and apply rentals and royalties accruing hereunder
toward satisfying same. Without impairment of lessee's rights under the warranty
in event of failure of title, it is agreed that if lessor owns an interest in said land
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A series of three cases, Whittington v. Bazemore,6 s Bazemore
v. Whittington,6 9 and Butler v. Bazemore,70 has done much to
develop the after-acquired title doctrine in the mineral lease area.
The facts for all three cases are as follows: Keatchie Investment
Corporation (Keatchie) sold land to G.I. Bazemore on October
27, 1941, reserving for itself half of the minerals, which were
leased to T. E. Robertson on March 11, 1947. Subsequently, on
May 1, 1947, Bazemore leased all the minerals to Robertson
Stores Incorporation notwithstanding he only owned half at the
time. This Bazemore-Robertson lease was eventually assigned
to Edman, Whittington, and Reed (Edman). Bazemore still
owned the land when Keatchie's servitude terminated.
Judge Dawkins of the United States District Court 7" simply
applied the after-acquired title doctrine and ruled that when
Keatchie's interest terminated, the minerals returned to the land-
owner-lessor, Bazemore, but inured to the benefit of his lessee's
assignee, Edman:
"Having previously granted an unrestricted lease, cover-
ing all of the minerals, upon reversion of Keatchie's interest
his warranty immediately ripened the lease into one covering
all of the minerals.
72
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 73 misunderstanding the
nature of the assignment to Edman of the Bazemore-Robertson
lease, overruled Judge Dawkins. The court, by improperly inter-
preting Waterman v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co.,74 thought
that the "assignment, without express warranties, in terms of
'all of its right, title, and interest' " was a quitclaim, and, thus,
there was no basis for applying the after-acquired title doctrine.
Judge Brown's interesting view of the case 75 is that T. E.
Robertson and Robertson Stores Incorporated were the same;
thus, as in Long-Bell Lumber Co. v. Granger,7" it would be im-
possible for Robertson Stores Incorporated to acquire a lease
which it already owned by the after-acquired title doctrine.
less than the entire fee simple estate, then the royalties and rentals to be paid
lessor shall be reduced proportionately."
68. 133 F. Supp. 163 (W.D. La. 1955).
69. 245 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1957).
70. 303 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1962).
71. Whittington v. Bazemore, 133 F. Supp. 163 (W.D La. 1955).
72. Id. at 168.
73. Bazemore v. Whittington, 245 F. 2d 943 (5th Cir. 1957).
74. 213 La. 588, 35 So. 2d 225 (1947).
75. Bazemore v. Whittington, 245 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1957).
76. 222 La. 670, 63 So. 2d 420 (1952).
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Butler v. Bazemore77 "is the inevitable result" of Bazemore v.
Whittington. In Butler the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recog-
nized it had misunderstood implied warranty under Louisiana
law in Bazemore, and, thus, overruled the decision.
A final problem is caused by express after-acquired title
clauses appearing in mineral leases. A typical clause reads as
follows:
"Lessor agrees that any additional or greater mineral
interest in the leased premises that may be acquired by him
by purchase or otherwise, is also included and leased here-
in."78
These clauses are, of course, not founded upon any warranty
on the part of the lessor; they are bargained for as any other
advantage. The lessee, under such a clause, is simply entitled
to any and all minerals on the property acquired by the lessor
whether there was an oversale or not. The question is whether
a purchaser of land subject to a mineral lease containing an
after-acquired title clause is bound by that clause. The juris-
prudence has consistently held that an after-acquired title clause
is a personal obligation of the original lessor and not binding
upon a purchaser of the property.79 In Calhoun v. Gulf Refining
Co. the court stated:
"The clause in the Thompson lease dealing with the out-
standing minerals merely evidenced a personal agreement
between the original parties to the lease, was dependent on
the happening of an uncertain event, and was limited to
whatever additional ownership in the mineral rights Thomp-
son might acquire while the lease was in full force and ef-
fect; the situation did not materialize; consequently, the
clause fell when Thompson failed to acquire outstanding min-
eral interests, and those became vested in Mrs. Calhoun, the
owner of the land, at the time the servitude was extinguished
because of its non-use for a period of more than ten years." s
Thus, it is apparent that as long as the after-acquired title
clause of a lease is the personal obligation of the original land-
owner and not binding on future purchasers it is valid. It is
77. 303 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1962).
78. Calhoun v. Gulf Ref. Co., 235 La. 491, 499, 104 So. 2d 547, 548 (1958).
79. Calhoun v. Gulf Ref. Co., 235 La. 494, 104 So. 2d 547 (1958) ; Williams v.
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 193 So. 2d 78 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
80. 235 La. 494, 508, 104 So. 2d 547, 552 (1958).
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submitted that these decisions support the idea that applying the
after-acquired title doctrine to its fullest extent is not contrary
to public policy because it too is a mere personal obligation of
the vendor.
CONCLUSION
The basic problem in applying the after-acquired title doc-
trine to the mineral transactions in Louisiana lies in the ap-
parent conflict between a desire to enforce the moral imperative
behind the doctrine and the prohibition against intentional deal-
ing with the reversionary interests in mineral rights. Although
applying the after-acquired title doctrine in its entirety to all
situations where the vendor remains owner of the land at the
termination of the outstanding servitude is not inconsistent with
established public policy against burdening the land for a period
of time greater than ten years without user; if, for policy rea-
sons, the doctrine must be limited, this limitation should be
recognized as arbitrary, because the obstacle theory is theoreti-
cally inconsistent with the after-acquired title doctrine.
A. J. Gray, III
REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENTS IN CRIMINAL CASES:
GUIDELINES FOR LOUISIANA
Never have the rights of those accused of crime been more
zealously protected than in contemporary America; the right to
legal representation has been the object of particularly close
judicial scrutiny. Gideon v. Wainwright' held that the sixth
amendment entitles an indigent accused of a felony to appointed
counsel at trial, whether in state or federal court. Escobedo v.
Illinois2 established that once police investigation focuses on the
accused, denial of his request to speak with a retained attorney
violates his right to counsel; all statements elicited during sub-
sequent detention are inadmissible 'at trial. The judicial move-
mept toward full implementation of the constitutional protection
perhaps reached culmination in Miranda v. Arizona,3 which as-
sured the indigent's right to appointed counsel during custodial
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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